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Introduction 
Youth curfews have been rejected in the academic literature both because they violate 
parents’ or young people’s rights (White, 1996, Chen, 1997) and because they are ineffective 
as a crime prevention measure (Reynolds et al., 2000, Adams, 2007, Wilson et al., 2016, 
Fried, 2001). These arguments have not been influential with policy makers, however, and 
the Northbridge youth curfew operated for almost nine years between June 2003 and 
February 2012. Curfew contexts and implementation differences complicate comparisons 
(Wilson et al., 2016). This article uses a case study to document context and implementation 
arrangements and to examine what can be learnt from the Northbridge curfew in Perth, 
including how it came about, how it operated, what it achieved, and the reasons for its 
demise. The article also analyses the legacy of the Northbridge curfew in terms of discourse 
about young people and legitimation of subsequent practices in youth policing that place 
blanket restriction on young people. 
Overview of curfews 
Curfews have a long history and have been applied for various purposes including political 
repression (Brass, 2006), to control the use of public spaces by particular sub-populations 
(Amsden, 2008, White, 1990), and for public safety (Miller, 2015). Curfews curtail 
democratic rights such as freedom of movement and political liberties (Brown, 2000). 
Curfews are only justifiable in democratic societies in extreme circumstances when it can be 
demonstrated that overriding benefits result from the proposed restrictions of rights (Brass, 
2006). Arguments to justify the Northbridge curfew claimed that a curfew would protect 
young people from harm, and also protect adults from harms caused by young people 
(Cooper et al., 2014). This paper will examine whether these claims can be substantiated in 
practice, whether a youth curfew was a proportionate response and whether there were 
unintended consequences, beneficial or otherwise. There is insufficient space here to explore 
more general questions about parents’ rights vs. state rights (Chen, 1997) or to discuss 
questions about youth rights (Brown, 2000) concepts of childhood and maturity (O'Neil, 
2002), which, whilst important, are not the focus of this article. 
Curfews can be universal, selective, or universal but discriminatory against particular sub-
populations. The Northbridge curfew is an example of a selective curfew that is also 
discriminatory against various youth sub-populations. Selective curfews apply only to some 
sections of the population, for example, youth-based curfews, or some racial groups. In the 
United States youth curfews have been more ubiquitous than elsewhere Chen (1997). Chen 
contends that youth curfews have been used cyclically as a populist and inexpensive measure 
by governments that want to appear to respond to public fear of youth crime and youth 
disorder (Chen, 1997). Over the past twenty-five years, youth curfews have been imposed in 
several jurisdictions, especially in the USA (Chen, 1997, ‘Youth Curfew Violates Equal-
Protection Rights’, 2004, Reynolds et al., 2000, Kline, 2012, O'Neil, 2002, Grossman, 2014, 
Moscovitz et al., 2000, McDowall et al., 2000).  
Other historical examples of selective curfews were the Aboriginal curfews that were once 
common across Australian cities and towns. Race-based curfews prevented all Indigenous 
people from entering towns, cities or specified places and usually applied after dark (Nugent, 
2008, South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council, 2015). In Western Australia, the first 
Indigenous curfew was enacted in 1840, eleven years after the British assumed colonial 
sovereignty over Western Australia (South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council, 2015). 
Aboriginal people had been excluded from Northbridge during the colonial and post-colonial 
period. The Aboriginal curfews only finally disappeared across the state when the 1975 
Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act made race-based restrictions illegal (Rayner, 
2003). Targeted race-based curfews were a legacy of colonial origins and are still found in 
some post-colonial countries (Brass, 2006). In Australia, the recency of Aboriginal curfews, 
combined with transport links which had made Northbridge a popular Indigenous meeting 
area, made the issue of a youth curfew in Northbridge a particular sensitive for Aboriginal 
young people and their families.  
In a democratic society there is a prima facie expectation that laws should provide equal 
protection to all. Selective curfew legislation potentially violates this requirement (White and 
Wyn, 2004). In addition, curfews differentially affect particular sections of the population 
(Brass, 2006), because of differential material circumstances or habitual patterns of 
recreation. The street is a place of recreation for poor and working class young people, who 
are also likely to be reliant on public transport (O'Neil, 2002). Curfews that apply only to 
pedestrians and those socialising in public space have a substantial impact on poorer 
Americans and Australians but little impact upon middle class Americans (or Australians) 
who have the ability and preference to pay for leisure activities in private venues, and to use 
private transport for night-time travel. In the USA, O'Neil (2002) argues that because poor 
and working class people are more likely to be people of colour, curfew legislation is 
inherently racist and does not meet the criteria for equal protection because it tends to 
criminalise poor and black people disproportionately. The Northbridge curfew also provides 
an example of a curfew that has differential effects on different youth sub-populations. The 
research reported in this article will assess whether the claim can be substantiated that the 
way the curfew applied offers sufficient benefits to young people (and/or others) that 
outweighed the restrictions and the indirect consequences of unequal protection. 
Finally, breaches of curfews can lead to qualitatively different consequences. Consequences 
may include an administrative action (such as welfare intervention), a criminal sanction (such 
as prosecution), or an extra-legal response (such as shooting). In the USA, many youth 
curfews discussed in the literature have legal consequences for parents or young people, and 
they can be taken to court and fined. In Australia and elsewhere (Walsh, 1999) the 
consequences are administrative, and a breach of curfew is treated as a welfare issue. Whilst 
this may seem more benign, Bessant (2013) (Bessant, 2013) cautions that as part of the 
liberal-welfarist tradition, administrative processes were used to enact the forced removal of 
Indigenous children from their parents, ‘for their own good’. From a rights perspective, a 
disadvantage of administrative processes is that there is often less effective recourse to 
challenge administrative decisions. One purpose of this research project was to examine the 




The research presented here was undertaken as part of a larger funded project to evaluate 
different approaches to youth night patrols. The research took a case study approach. The 
‘case’ or bounded system was the Northbridge Policy Project (NPP), (2003–2012), including 
the Northbridge Policy, which provided the legal framework for the project. The research 
made use of data from multiple sources as is usual in case study research (Creswell, 2013, 
Yin, 2014). The underlying assumption behind this approach is that a case study can enable a 
more nuanced and holistic understanding of phenomena (Creswell, 2013). This outcome, 
however, depends upon careful cross-comparison of different types of data from multiple 
sources and perspectives. This facilitates triangulation, and enables researchers to capture 
both complexity and contradictions, and to present different perspectives on how programs 
work and their strengths and limitations.  
For this project, we conducted interviews with stakeholders who represented organisations 
with an interest in the Northbridge Policy. This included policy makers, representatives of 
organisations who implemented the Northbridge policy (Northbridge Policy Project partners), 
representatives of business groups in Northbridge, and representatives of youth work 
organisations that operated in Northbridge but were not part of the Northbridge Policy 
Project. We requested interviews with families and young people who had used the 
Northbridge Policy Project services, but were told none were willing to participate. We also 
analysed quantitative data provided by the Northbridge Policy Project (NPP), by the Public 
Transport Authority (PTA) in Western Australia, and police data about reported incidents in 
Northbridge from the police research unit in WA. Previous evaluations and other public 
documents provided a further source of information. The case study presented here is derived 
from a synthesis of this data, which is presented more fully in (Cooper et al., 2014). The 
research was approved and overseen by the Edith Cowan University Human Ethics Research 
Committee. Data was analysed for the whole period (2003–2012), but the description of the 
day-to-day working of the project relates to the period 2010–2012. 
The Northbridge Policy 
Northbridge is the main night-time entertainment district and a social gathering place for 
Indigenous people, including young people. The Northbridge Policy legislation was 
implemented in 2003 and restricts children’s and young people’s access to Northbridge in 
Perth, Western Australia. A welfare approach would be taken, unless the child or young 
person had committed a criminal offence. This meant that no criminal penalty would be 
applied to a young person or their family if they were found in breach of the curfew.  
The stated purposes of the Northbridge Policy were improved child protection and prevention 
of harm; prevention of crime and nuisance by children and young people; and improvement 
of the Northbridge precinct. The Northbridge Policy applies to two categories of children and 
young people (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006b): 
Category 1: ‘Children not under the immediate care of a parent or a responsible adult who 
are vulnerable by their age in an adult entertainment precinct at night. These are: 
• Primary school age children, that is children 12 years of age and under, in the 
Northbridge precinct during the hours of darkness. 
• Young people 13 to 15 years of age in the Northbridge precinct after 10.00 pm.’ 
Category 2: ‘Children and young people who by their anti-social, offending or health 
compromising behaviour are at risk to themselves and to others. These are: 
• Any children or young people misbehaving, engaging in violence, intimidation, 
provoking aggression or other offensive behaviours. 
• Any children or young people, visibly affected by or engaging in substance abuse 
(e.g. alcohol, cannabis, solvents and other substances). 
• Any children or young people soliciting or begging.’ 
The Northbridge Policy was intended to apply to ‘children and young people who are 
physically or morally vulnerable or engaging in anti-social, offending or health 
compromising behaviour’ (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006b) but not to apply to ‘those 
children and young people who have legitimate reasons for being in Northbridge, to go to or 
from employment, are resident in Northbridge, or are under the immediate care of a parent or 
a responsible adult’ (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006b).  
The Northbridge Policy and associated Northbridge Policy Project (NPP) were controversial 
when first proposed, and were opposed by youth organisations (Koch, 2003), Indigenous 
organisations (Carson, 2003), rights organisations (Outcare, n.d., Rayner, 2003) and police 
organisations (Armstrong, 2003). By contrast, the legislation was strongly supported in the 
print media and had overwhelming public support (MacArthur, 2007). 
Factors that shaped the Northbridge Policy  
The Northbridge Policy was shaped by both overt and covert concerns. The main overt 
concerns were child protection; public nuisance; perceptions of public safety; and concern 
about urban decline. The less visible covert purposes of the policy were to improve 
collaboration between government departments, especially the police and the department 
responsible for child welfare (variously DFCS DCS, DCP), and concern to clarify the child 
welfare legislation.  
Concerns about child protection arose because of the visible presence of drugs, alcohol, and 
street prostitution, (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006a) and because large numbers of young 
people gathered there. In 2003, between January and March 2003, before the policy was 
implemented, the Juvenile Aid Group (the specialist police team responsible for inner city 
child welfare) apprehended over 450 children and young people under the provisions of the 
Child Welfare Act 1947. This raised concerns that welfare organisations were not acting to 
prevent harm. A purpose of the Northbridge Policy was that the NPP should provide 
proactive services that would prevent harm to children and young people as well as 
responding to immediate risk and protection needs.  
Concerns about public nuisance and perceived decline in safety, as well as urban decline in 
Northbridge also shaped the policy, especially the provisions under Category 2 of the 
legislation. The Busch report (2002) found that Northbridge was perceived by the public and 
local businesses to have become more dangerous in recent years. Businesses owners 
expressed concerned customers would move to other nearby inner-city entertainment districts 
that were perceived to be safer. The Busch report recommended an integrated approach to 
crime prevention and community safety to address these concerns, both real and perceived.  
Behind the scenes, the Northbridge Policy was shaped by concerns about inter-departmental 
collaboration. According to participants, the Northbridge Policy was intended to address 
issues raised by the Gordon Inquiry (Gordon et al., 2002). The Gordon Inquiry had strongly 
criticised the systemic failure of multiple government departments in Western Australia to 
collaborate when working with Indigenous young people and their families. According to one 
interviewee an important purpose of the Northbridge Policy was to ensure that the relevant 
government departments ‘acknowledge their responsibilities for the long-term welfare of 
those children’ (interviewee, government agency) and act appropriately.  
The Gordon Inquiry had examined the circumstances surrounding the death of a 15 year old 
Aboriginal girl who had committed suicide in 1999. She had previously reported to various 
government departments, including police, child protection and the youth justice, that she had 
been assaulted and sexual abused. All of these departments had documented serious concerns 
for the young woman, including poverty, pregnancy and substance abuse, and nineteen 
organisations were involved with the young woman and her family, but no department took a 
lead role in coordinating assistance to her or her family. The report concluded that 
communications between agencies were poor, and lines of responsibility between agencies 
were unclear. The Gordon Inquiry made specific recommendations about how services to 
Aboriginal young people and their families could be improved, including through better 
government inter-department collaboration and information sharing about child welfare 
issues and support. In response to the Gordon Inquiry, the Government released a policy 
document (Government of Western Australia, 2002) where they accepted the need for better 
communication and coordination when multiple agencies work with the same family, and 
accepted that highly mobile young people are especially vulnerable and need better support 
services, and the NPP was intended to integrate such services in the inner city. . 
A second less visible concern was to clarify the meaning and application of child welfare 
legislation. Section 138B of the Child Welfare Act 1947 (WA), required the Police and others 
to apprehend children and young people who were ‘at risk of physical and moral danger or 
were misbehaving and return them to their usual place of residence’ (Office of Crime 
Prevention, 2004). Enforcement of this legislation required judgement about what constituted 
physical and moral danger or misbehaviour. The Northbridge Policy was intended to provide 
guidance to police on the application this section of the Act in relation to Northbridge (Office 
of Crime Prevention, 2006a, Office of Crime Prevention, 2004). The Northbridge Policy 
legislation specifically ‘targets children and young people, not under the supervision of a 
parent or adult, when there is a risk to their well-being because of the nature of the place 
where they are found or the behaviours they are exhibiting’ (Office of Crime Prevention, 
2006b). Lack of adult supervision and the nature of the location are explicitly identified as 
factors that make a child or young person vulnerable, even when the conduct of the young 
person does not contribute to risk. This was subsequently explicitly incorporated into the 
amended child welfare legislation in the Children and Community Services Act 2004 
(WA)(Government of Western Australia, 2004) under Section 41, which: 
‘Authorises a police officer (or authorised officer) to move an unsupervised 
child to a safe place, if that officer reasonably believes that there is a “risk to 
the well-being of the child because of the nature of the place where the child 
is found, the behaviour or vulnerability of the child at that place or any other 
circumstance”.’. 
The language of the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA)(Government of 
Western Australia, 2004) aligns with the interpretations of child welfare found in the 
Northbridge Policy and the language of child welfare/ protection has changed from ‘physical 
and moral danger and misbehaviour’ to a more inclusive, net-widening, concept of ‘risk to 
well-being’.  
In summary, there were at least six purposes of the legislation and project: 
1. Reactive prevention of immediate harm to children and young people found in 
Northbridge 
2. Proactive prevention of youth harm, youth crime, youth nuisance and disorder, to 
supplement reactive intervention by police, and in the long-term, reduce the need for 
reactive responses  
3. Improvement of government inter-departmental communication and collaboration on 
child protection  
4. Clarification of the meaning of the Child Welfare Act in the context of Northbridge 
5. Reduction of youth crime and nuisance in Northbridge 
6. Improvement of perceptions of public safety in Northbridge 
The remit of the Northbridge Policy Project was to achieve these purposes. 
The Northbridge Policy Project 
Prior to the NPP, child welfare in public places had been primarily the responsibility of the 
police. This legislation changed the balance of power (and responsibility) between the police 
department and the social welfare department. The Northbridge Policy Project (NPP) was 
established to implement six purposes of the Northbridge Policy. The project operated from 
June 2003 until February 2012. According to NPP records, in the first six months, large 
numbers of young people were apprehended, most were Aboriginal (88%) and more girls 
(66%) were apprehended than boys; 13% of apprehensions were of children aged 12 years 
old or younger; 66% of apprehensions were of young people aged 13–15 years; and 21% of 
young people apprehended were aged 16–17 years. After six months, the numbers steadily 
declined and have continued to decline (Cooper et al., 2014).  
The first evaluation concluded the NPP had been successful (Office of Crime Prevention, 
2004) on the basis of reductions in numbers of young people apprehended. A second 
evaluation (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006), concluded that the policy had achieved 
significant outcomes including improved community confidence, and had reduced the 
number of unsupervised young people on the streets of Northbridge late at night. However, 
both evaluations mentioned on-going difficulties with inter-agency collaboration, including 
concerns about poor communication, different interpretations of the meaning of the 
Northbridge policy (especially terms like ‘responsible adult’ and ‘misbehaviour’), 
disagreements about which agency was responsible for transporting young people who had 
been apprehended, and concerns about transport inefficiencies. The 2006 evaluation also 
suggested the geographical boundaries of the project should be reconsidered, the operational 
hours should be extended to include Wednesday nights, and that case management processes 
should be improved for young people who repeatedly ignored the curfew. Finally the report 
recommended that WA Police officers should be permanently assigned to the Juvenile Aid 
Group (JAG) team, instead of being rotated according to standard police staffing practices, 
which meant frequent staff changes.  
A new manager of the NPP was appointed in 2008 and in response to this evaluation, 
prioritised inter-agency collaboration, improvement of processes for case management and 
efficiencies in transport arrangements. The main inter-agency difficulties arose from 
reluctance of the police and social work departments to share information with each other. 
Operational difficulties arose if any of the police officers were assigned to other duties, as 
sometimes happened. According to one participant, there were also difficulties with social 
work follow-up prior to 2007, because social workers from other districts failed to follow up 
families of children and young people apprehended in Northbridge.  
The manager reviewed the priorities of the project and decided to prioritise Category 1 (child 
protection, young people under 16 years old), and to cease giving priority to Category 2 
(public order/anti-social behaviour/ crime prevention, young people aged 16–17 years). This 
decision meant that staff no longer had to interpret what was meant by ‘misbehaviour’ and 
could focus resources on child protection rather than offending or anti-social conduct. In 
2008, this was possible because the public order outcomes were perceived to have been 
achieved. A consequence of this decision was that the juvenile justice outreach workers 
(Killara) had a lesser role in the project.  
Northbridge Policy Project partners (2010-2012) 
The concept of inter-agency collaboration became central to the NPP (Cooper et al., 2016). In 
2010, there were three core agencies, and several other partner agencies. The core agencies 
were the Department for Child Protection (DCP), the Western Australia Police (WAPOL) 
and Mission Australia. 
The DCP had various roles in the project: they provided project management; they referred 
some families for on-going mandated social work case management where this was judged 
necessary; and, they liaised with the district offices to ensure follow-up occurred. Outreach 
Workers managed by the senior social worker patrolled Northbridge on foot, made contact 
with children or young people who were subject to the Northbridge Policy. The role of the 
outreach workers was to educate young people and divert them away from the more formal 
apprehension processes. An emergency social work team, (Crisis Care), assessed all young 
people who were apprehended and made decisions about whether it was safe to return the 
child or young person to their home. If the home was judged unsafe, Crisis Care found 
alternative accommodation, and arranged transport. Crisis Care staff collated all child 
protection information about young people who were apprehended.  
The Western Australian Police were involved in the project through the Juvenile Aid Group 
(JAG). JAG was a special unit within the WA Police formed in 1991 to work with children 
and young people, and eventually disbanded in 2013. The rationale for the formation of the 
JAG team was to create a specialist team who could collaborate with other agencies to 
prevent or delay entry of children and young people into the justice system (Browne, 2000). 
The role of JAG within the project was to apprehend children and young people who were in 
breach of the curfew, to search them for drugs and weapons, to gain information about 
criminal offences, and to check their identity.  
Mission Australia, a non-government organisation, had three roles in the project. Firstly, they 
provided an alternative to police custody for young people who had been processed by JAG 
and Crisis Care and were awaiting transport. If young people did not agree to this, or if they 
were arrested for an offence, they were held in police custody. Secondly, Mission Australia 
provided voluntary case work support to families of young people apprehended, sometimes in 
collaboration with social workers from the Department for Child Protection (Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2010, Mission Australia, n.d., Department of Child Protection, 2012) 
Thirdly, Mission Australia operated the ‘On-TRACK’ program to provide a preventative 
‘brief intervention service’ to young people who had been apprehended under the 
Northbridge Policy.  
Other NPP partners included the Department of Corrective Services, Killara Youth Justice, 
the Nyoongar Patrol Outreach Service, the Public Transport Authority, the Department of 
Education Western Australia and the Department of Sport and Recreation (Department of 
Child Protection, 2012). The Department of Corrective Services provided a youth crime 
prevention and diversion service (Killara). Their role was to provide outreach support 
services to young people and their families who have had contact with the police or law, and 
sometimes to provide transport home (Department for Corrective Services, 2010). Killara 
became less involved in the project post-2008, after the project priorities changed. 
The Nyoongar Patrol Outreach Service, a community-based service, was funded to operate an 
Indigenous night patrol across the Perth metropolitan area ‘to provide early interventions to 
Indigenous people frequenting public spaces in various locations around the city’. The 
principle target groups were Indigenous people of all ages, either from Perth or from remote 
areas, who were at risk of contact with the criminal justice system because of welfare or other 
issues (NPS, 2011). Their role in the project was to provide transport for Indigenous young 
people, and to liaise with Indigenous families. The Public Transport Authority (PTA) 
operates a security team of Transit Officers who are responsible for security and safety on 
Perth trains. The role of the PTA security was to share information with the project and to 
facilitate transport of young people by train and bus. The Department of Education (Western 
Australia) Attendance Unit was linked to initiatives such as the Student Tracking System and 
the ‘Students Whereabouts Unknown’ list and they checked whether young people who were 
apprehended in Northbridge are enrolled in school, and whether they attended. The 
Department of Sport and Recreation, in conjunction with other organisations, provided 
diversionary activities in localities and suburbs outside the city centre to discourage children 
and young people from coming to Northbridge.  
Influences shaping practices of the Northbridge Policy Project  
Several antecedent projects influenced the way the NPP operated. The NPP incorporated 
aspects of the Hillarys Youth Project Enquiry (HYPE) outreach model which had been 
developed to manage large groups of young people in public spaces. The HYPE model had 
been trialled in 1998–1999 as a diversionary response to behaviour by young people that was 
perceived as risky or a threat to public order (AIC, 2002, Stirling Council, 2001). In the 
HYPE project, the Department of Family and Children’s Services (the social work 
department) had been the lead agency and partial funder in partnership with local government 
and local businesses (Jarvis, 2003, Stirling Council, 2001). The HYPE project was 
established in response to perceived problems similar to those identified in the Northbridge 
Policy – large gatherings of several hundred young people aged 12–16 years, under-age 
drinking, public order concerns, prostitution for alcohol, and drugs usage by young people 
(AIC, 2002, Stirling Council, 2001). The role of the outreach workers was to divert young 
people away from actions that might place them at risk, might be deemed anti-social, or 
might lead to police intervention (Stirling Council, 2001). The HYPE teams collaborated with 
police and security, and if young people did not respond to diversion, police and security 
intervened. The HYPE approach had been was transferred from its original location at a 
marina entertainment precinct (Jarvis, 2003) to several other locations, especially shopping 
malls. The first manager of the NPP previously had a prominent role in the HYPE project 
(pers. comm.), and the NPP project adopted key elements of the HYPE model, especially the 
management structure and the use of outreach workers to divert large groups of young people 
as a first stage intervention. 
The Northbridge Policy Project also built upon pre-existing inter-agency collaboration in 
Northbridge and the Perth City Centre. A precursor to the Northbridge Policy project was the 
Inner City Youth Partnership (ICYP), established in the 1990s, which included JAG, the state 
social work department, Crisis Care (the emergency social work team), the education 
department, Killara, and non-government service providers, including Nyoongar Patrol 
System Inc. and Mission Australia’s On-Track Program (Browne, 2000). This group also 
formed links with other services that could provide family support, and drug and alcohol 
counselling and crisis accommodation.  
How the project operated 
There were four main changes brought about by the Northbridge Policy with change the way 
the Northbridge Policy Project functioned compared with the precursor projects. Firstly, an 
explicit youth curfew was instituted. Secondly, management of the project passed from the 
police to the social work department. Thirdly, the social work department took a much 
greater role, including the support of an additional outreach team, and active liaison about 
case management. Fourthly, the geographical boundaries of the project were explicitly 
restricted to Northbridge. 
Between 2010 and 2012, the NPP operated three nights per week, on Thursday, Friday and 
Saturday nights between 8pm and 2am. On the remaining days the specific provisions of the 
Northbridge curfew were not enforced. Project staff from various agencies took different 
roles. Before 10pm most staff were involved in outreach and engagement where the aim was 
to build rapport with young people, educate them about the Northbridge policy and the 
consequences if they ignored the curfew, to encourage positive peer pressure and risk 
reduction, and to encourage them to go home. Where necessary, the team provided young 
people with transport vouchers to enable them to use public transport to leave Northbridge 
before the curfew. If children under 13 years old were found after nightfall without 
supervision of a responsible adult, they were apprehended by police and proceeded to Phase 
2. After 10pm, young people under 16 years old without a responsible adult might be 
apprehended and proceed to Phase 2. In Phase 2, young people were first processed by the 
police to check their identity and searched for weapons, drugs or stolen property. After this, 
the young person would be assessed by social workers to ascertain their circumstances, 
whether they had an existing social work record with the department and to find a safe place 
for the young person to be taken. After processing, most young people were held in the 
lounge area of the centre, which was staffed by Mission Australia workers, until either their 
parents collected them or transport could be arranged to take them home. Most young people 
(over 80%), were transported home and no further follow-up was deemed necessary. The 
process is summarised in Table 1. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The phases presented in Table 1 reflect changes made during the course of the project. A 
manual Young People in Northbridge Policy (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004) outlined 
how judgements about risk of harm and offending should be made. According to the manual: 
• Phase 1: Diversion ‘Children and young people considered to be at low risk will be 
advised to leave the area.’  
• Phase 2: Apprehension or arrest 
o ‘Children and young people considered to be at medium to high risk of 
physical or moral danger or who are misbehaving will be assisted from the 
streets, assessed and linked to a safe place and to safe people.’ [apprehension] 
o Or, ‘Children and young people who are offending will be liable to police 
action and dealt with in accordance with prevailing laws.’ [arrest] 
• Phase 3: Follow-up to determine which services needed to engage further with young 
people and their families  
• Phase 4: Debrief, agency learning and sharing of perspectives and concerns  
Evaluation of the NPP 
The evaluation found the NPP was well-resourced and well-organised. Funding was recurrent 
and most staff had permanent employment contracts. The project had developed excellent 
staff training, support, mentoring and professional development systems, and maintained 
comprehensive records of all apprehensions and how they were followed-up. The formal 
agreements and informal negotiations between agencies and departments had greatly 
improved collaboration between partners.  
On the positive side, the achievement of functional inter-departmental collaboration was no 
mean feat. The agreements described in the project manual Young People in Northbridge 
Policy (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004) clarified responsibilities and processes, and 
developed procedures for conflict avoidance and resolution and safeguards for information-
sharing. It took nearly three years to gain formal agreement from all departments. These 
agreements provided an appropriate response to the recommendations of the Gordon Inquiry. 
Although these agreements were made in the context of the Northbridge Policy curfew 
legislation, they could have been negotiated on the basis of the Children and Community 
Services Act 2004 (WA) under Section 41, which facilitates action to apprehend children and 
young people at risk of harm but does not mandate a curfew. 
Also positive was the process developed for reactive crisis protection of children and young 
people found in Northbridge late at night. The service offered a supportive environment to 
children and young people and provided a better alternative to holding children and young 
people in police custody pending arrangements for transport home or to a place of safety. The 
NPP had effective systems of crisis support for young people under 16 years old who were 
found in Northbridge on the nights and hours that the project operated. There were good 
systems to check that the young person was returned to a safe place and to find alternative 
accommodation when no safe place could be found. The project meant that young people 
were not held in police lock-ups, and were held in a youth friendly environment. For young 
people under 16 years old who were found in Northbridge, there was good evidence that they 
received age-appropriate support and care if they were apprehended. Although this process 
was implemented in the context of the Northbridge Policy, it could have been implemented in 
the context of the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA) under Section 41 
without the curfew.  
Stakeholders interviewed perceived that crime committed by young people in Northbridge 
had decreased, and their perceptions were consistent with WA Police crime incident report 
data and with NPP data on apprehensions. However, the picture from the crime incident 
report data is complicated because young adults have always been more likely than juveniles 
to be charged with criminal offences in Northbridge, and because police crime statistics do 
not always record minor offences that have been dealt with informally. Stakeholders reported 
they perceived that public safety had increased in Northbridge. It is difficult to determine the 
effects of the curfew legislation on perceptions of public safety, because there is little 
correlation between public perceptions of safety and objective measures of safety (like the 
frequency of assaults). In addition, several other changes in Northbridge over the life of the 
project, from planning, landscaping and gentrification, to policing, security cameras, and 
liquor licencing, have all had potential to change public perceptions of safety. In addition, 
this begs the question raised by Amsden (2008) about the legitimacy of achieving 
comfortable and sanitised public spaces by excluding people who are not considered suitable 
aesthetic. It is however, plausible to accept curfew legislation may have contributed to 
perceptions of safety for some people. 
We interviewed several participants whose role was to provide proactive programs to parents 
and young people through the NNP. All stated that it was very difficult to engage families in 
the programs offered, and very few families voluntarily participated. Some stakeholders 
claimed family support processes were effective with those who took them up, and this is 
reported in a document produced by the project (Department of Child Protection, 2012). 
Others were more sceptical and were not convinced of the effectiveness of proactive 
programs provided. We did not have access to any data that might corroborate claims of 
effectiveness and did not have access to interview anyone who had benefited from these 
programs. 
In terms of the intended Northbridge Policy purposes, the NPP had potentially contributed to 
achievement of four of the six intended policy outcomes. At first sight, this seems like a good 
outcome that might potentially justify the curfew arrangements. 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Closer inspection, and analysis of how the curfew functioned in practice, presents a less 
positive picture. Evidence gathered from the NPP records confirmed that decreasing numbers 
of young people were apprehended in Northbridge. Our analysis confirmed that the most 
likely explanation for this was that fewer young people were coming to Northbridge on days 
the curfew operated. Previous evaluations made the assumption that if young people stopped 
coming to Northbridge, they would be in a safer location. Our evaluation questions that 
assumption. Based upon analysis of multiple participant interviews, data provided by the 
Public Transport Authority, the youth crime data provided by WA Police, and the 
demographic changes within NPP data, we concluded the main effect of the curfew was 
displacement of significant numbers of young people from Northbridge to other locations. At 
the time of data collection in 2011–2012, several participants indicated in interviews that 
large numbers of young people, including many Indigenous young people whose family 
groups previously came to Northbridge, now gathered in a secluded area near Burswood 
station, adjacent to the casino. This displacement was acknowledged by one participant in 
this statement. 
‘One of the oldest Policeman’s tools in his toolbox was always," if you can’t 
solve crime you’ll displace it somewhere else"’ (interviewee, Police). 
Some participants believed the alternative location was more risky than Northbridge because 
of the lack of support services and lack of surveillance.  
The greatest achievement of the project was improvement of inter-departmental (Bessant, 
2013)collaboration, which seemed to have made real systemic changes that addressed the 
concerns of the Gordon Inquiry and meant that Indigenous young people who were 
apprehended were less likely to fall between the cracks. This is something that many 
government departments struggle with, and the processes used by this project could be 
beneficially applied in other contexts. The other achievement was to create a safety-net for 
children and young people in Northbridge and a youth-friendly environment to avoid them 
being held in police custody. It should be noted, however, that the curfew was not an 
essential element of either of these achievements. 
The end of the Northbridge Policy Project 
The Northbridge Policy Project ended abruptly and unexpectedly. It came as an 
administrative decision announced in mid-2011 and implemented in early 2012. A decision 
had been made to outsource the management of the project, as a part of a process to 
rationalise the youth programmes funded by DCP, the social work department. This decision 
to outsource services formed part of the neo-liberal agenda for new public management. 
Tenders were invited for the management of the project, and Mission Australia was 
successful. The outreach team managed by DCP was disbanded and the functions of the team 
were assumed by Mission Australia.  
The legacy of the Northbridge Policy Project 
The demise of the project had several consequences. Some participants accurately predicted 
the diminution of collaborative between government departments. As one of the interviewees 
stated, non-government organisations cannot hold government departments to account and 
ensure they fulfil their responsibilities and duties, especially if they rely on the same 
departments for funding.  
‘An NGO can't say to education, for instance, "Why isn't this kid going to 
school? You've got to do something about it." The schools will say, "Well, 
keep your nose out of our business," whereas the Department and the 
Director-General can get on the phone and say to their counterparts in 
education, "This is not good enough. You've got to do something about it.”.... 
A government agency has got to be pivotal to driving it’ (interviewee, 
government employee) 
This assessment proved accurate, at least for the period immediately after the transition. The 
collaborative agreements, that took three years to ratify, became irrelevant overnight. 
Although formal leadership was held by Mission Australia, in terms of power, the police 
department resumed its more dominant role, and collaboration declined. For practical 
purposes the project shared many similarities with the arrangement that had existed before 
the Northbridge Policy.  
A legacy of the NPP was the legitimation of curfews for young people, in Perth and in other 
parts of Australia. In late 2011, the police commenced Operation Safe Place, a three month 
project in the summer of 2011–2012 (Short, 2012). This project replicated some of the 
practices of the Northbridge Policy Project but was more restrictive of young people. Key 
differences were that the operation was police-led rather than led by the social work 
department, and was implemented across the Perth Metropolitan area. No additional 
legislation was required because police already had sufficient powers under the Children and 
Community Services Act 2004 (WA). Without any additional legislation, police were 
empowered to apprehend any young person under 18 years old (not just those under 16 years 
old), who was without adult supervision ‘after dark’ (which is about 8pm in summertime in 
Perth). That is, it applied to all young people after 8pm anywhere in Perth in contrast to 
young people under 16 years old after 10pm in Northbridge under the Northbridge policy. 
This constituted a considerable net-widening when compared with the Northbridge policy. 
Unlike the implementation of the Northbridge policy, opposition to this ‘administrative 
interpretation’ was muted. The implementation of the curfew also had an ongoing legacy in 
its influence over policy discussions in Perth where water cannon were proposed (Weber, 
2005), in other parts of Australia, for example, the policy statement by Nigel Scullion, federal 
minister for Indigenous affairs (Karvelas, 2014, p. 1), in Queensland (The Cairns Post, 2009, 
p. 2) also in South Australia. 
Discussion 
The circumstances that surrounded the policy development of the Northbridge Policy had all 
the features of a moral panic, as described by Cohen (1972). According to Cohen, a ‘moral 
panic’ is ‘A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests’ (p. 9). In the first stage of a moral panic, the scale of 
supposed problem is exaggerated in the media, so that readers and listeners believe that it is 
something that will have an immediate, severe and detrimental effect on their own lives 
unless something is done. In relation to the origins of the Northbridge Policy, this is well 
documented by MacArthur (2007). A hallmark of the first stage of a social panic is that the 
mass media presents particular groups of people in a stylised and stereotypical way. 
Individuals are described negatively, and negative stereotypes are recycled to present a “folk 
devil” that the public will rally against. Historically, young people have been the targets of 
moral panics, and, in Australia, Indigenous people have been recurrent targets of ‘moral 
panics’, resulting in legislation that targets and restricts both groups.  
Media descriptions of the folk devil reinforce and emphasise the differences between the 
objects of the moral panic and ‘ordinary people’. Indigenous young people were presented in 
highly stereotypical ways as a threat to everyday life, for example at the time of the 
Northbridge Policy a highly publicised incident when a young person stole food from an 
al-fresco diner’s plate. The discourse used served political purposes and enabled the 
government to appear to be both tough on crime and strong on child protection, both populist 
causes (MacArthur, 2007).  
Cohen (1972) cautioned there are sometimes long-term effects of a moral panic that can 
change social policy and the legal framework, and even change the way that members of 
society see themselves. The usual responses to a moral panic are harsher and more repressive 
laws, and reductions in freedom and legal protections for the whole population. The 
Northbridge Policy provides a good example of this process in action. The Northbridge 
Policy was legislated even though it could have been instituted purely administratively 
(MacArthur, 2007). The most impressive achievement of the Northbridge Policy Project was 
effective coordination of multiple government agencies, but this could have been achieved 
without a youth curfew, simply by building upon the previous Inner-City Youth Partnership, 
and making the changes to organisation and leadership. If this had occurred, it may also have 
been easier to enter into constructive partnership with other youth organisations that were 
alienated from the project because of the curfew and the way political debate had demonised 
young people.  
In the final stage of a moral panic, according to Cohen, the phenomenon either disappears, or 
becomes less visible, but continues ‘beneath the radar’; or, worsens and becomes more 
visible. In this instance, the phenomena have become less visible in Northbridge, but have 
continued ‘beneath the radar’ in other locations. Cohen noted that a moral panic may be 
quickly forgotten, or may leave a legacy of repressive policy and legal changes, and that 
repressive legal responses may amplify the problem as more people are criminalised and 
become alienated, and tolerance is reduced. In this case, the Northbridge Policy left a legacy 
of public acceptance of youth curfews and the erroneous belief that they provided an effective 
response. Acceptance of these fallacies has led to acceptance of youth policing practices that 
places blanket restrictions on young peoples’ activities supposedly ‘for their own good’ and 
has contributed to a discourse that infantilises all young people under 18 years old, 
irrespective of their individual conduct, maturity and competence.  
Conclusion 
The case study illustrated some interesting, some surprising, and perhaps some mundane 
findings. The legislation brought some benefits. Temporarily, the balance of power and 
responsibility between the police department and the social welfare department changed. This 
occurred because the NPP was managed by the social welfare department with the police and 
others as partners. This change meant that young people detained because of welfare 
concerns were no longer held by the police (unless they had committed an arrestable 
offence). Briefly, through good leadership, this arrangement also enabled much greater 
collaboration between various government departments and non-government organisation.  
Less positively, the Northbridge Policy and youth curfew achieved many of its purposes 
primarily through displacement of young people to other locations. A major effect of the 
curfew was to ‘move the problem’. This outcome disproportionately affected Indigenous 
young people. Because these locations were also risky, this did not make young people safer 
overall. The coercion inherent in the curfew also undermined the proactive elements of the 
NPP, and especially the willingness of families to engage with support services. The 
reinterpretation of the Child Welfare Act (1947) by the Northbridge Policy placed the focus 
on the nature of the place, and on what other people might do the young person, rather than 
the conduct of the young person themselves. From a rights perspective this is a concern 
because it represents an attempt to prevent victimisation by restricting the freedoms of the 
potential victim, who must modify their activities and conduct. This approach is open to 
objection that it places undue responsibility on the potential victim rather than potential 
offenders. This line of argument has been resisted in the context of other offences, most 
notably rape. 
We concluded therefore, that the benefits of the Northbridge curfew did not justify the 
restrictions on rights imposed under the policy. Further we concluded that the youth curfew 
was an unhelpful and unnecessary component of the Northbridge Policy because the 
beneficial outcomes of the NPP could have been achieved without the curfew legislation, and 
the curfew inhibited important aspects of the program. Perhaps the most concerning aspect of 
the Northbridge Policy is its legacy that has unnecessarily legitimised ineffective and 
coercive approaches to concerns about young people’s welfare and youth crime. The media 
representation unnecessarily demonised young people, and led to a lasting public acceptance 
of even more repressive (and ultimately ineffective) policy approaches to youth crime 
prevention and child protection.  
The most surprising and paradoxical finding is that the end of the Northbridge Policy project 
occurred as a by-product of neo-liberal public management ideology rather than out of 
concern for either policy effectiveness, or for young people rights.  
References 
Adams, K. 2007. Abolish Juvenile Curfews. Criminology & Public Policy, 6, 663–669. 
AIC 2002. Crime Facts Info Number 37, Canberra, Australian Institute of Criminology. 
Amsden, B. 2008. Negotiating Liberalism and Bio-Politics: Stylizing Power in Defense of the 
Mall Curfew. The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 94, 407. 
Armstrong, G. (2003). Police say curfew is unworkable. The Sunday Times, 20 April, 8. 
Bessant, J. C. (2013). History and Australian Indigenous child welfare policies. Policy 
Studies, 34(3), 310.  
Brass, P. 2006. Collective Violence, Human Rights, and the Politics of Curfew. Journal of 
Human Rights, 5, 323–340. 
Brown, B. K. 2000. Scrutinizing juvenile curfews: Constitutional standards & the 
fundamental rights of juveniles & parents. Vanderbilt Law Review, 53, 653–683. 
Browne, P. 2000. Early Detection And Intervention for ‘At Risk’ Youth. Conference 
Reducing Criminality: Partnerships and Best Practice (Perth, 31 July and 1 August 
2000). Perth, Australian Institute of Criminology, in association with the WA 
Ministry of Justice, Department of Local Government, Western Australian Police 
Service and Safer WA. 
Busch, J. 2002. Northbridge: Shaping the Future. Perth, Dept of Premier and Cabinet, 
Government of Western Australia. 
Carson, V. (2003). Black MP condemns youth curfew in nightclub zone. The Australian: WA 
Country Edition, 4. 
Chen, G. (1997). Youth curfews and the trilogy of parent, child, and state relations. New York 
University Law Review, 72(1), 131–174.  
Cohen, S. 1972. Folk Devils and Moral Panics, London, MacGibbon & Kee. 
Commonwealth of Australia 2010. National Youth Policing Model, Barton, ACT, Attorney 
Generals’ Departmentt  
Cooper, T., Scott, J., Barclay, E., Sims, M. & Love, T. 2016. Crime prevention and young 
people: Models and future direction for youth night patrols. Crime Prevention and 
Community Safety, 18, 226–283. 
Cooper, T., Sims, M., Scott, J., Henry, P., Barclay, E. and Love, T. (2014). Evaluation of 
Indigenous Justice programs Project D: Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrol Programs in 
New South Wales and Northbridge Policy and Juvenile Aid Group in Western 
Australia. Canberra, Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department. Available 
https://www.indigenousjustice.gov.au/resources/evaluation-of-indigenous-justice-
programs-project-d-safe-aboriginal-youth-patrol-programs-in-new-south-wales-and-
northbridge-policy-and-juvenile-aid-group-in-western-australia/  (accessed 10 Jun. 
2017).  
Creswell, J. W. 2013. Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five 
approaches, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications. 
Department for Corrective Services 2010. Killara Youth Support Service, Perth, Department 
of Corrective Services, Government of Western Australia. 
Department of Child Protection 2012. Young People in Northbridge Project, Perth, 
Department of Child Protection. 
Fried, C. S. 2001. Juvenile curfews: are they an effective and constitutional means of 
combating juvenile violence?. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 19, 127–141. 
Gordon, S., Hallahan, K. & Henry, D. 2002. Putting the Picture Together: Inquiry into 
Response by Government Agencies to Complaints of Family Violence and Child 
Abuse in Aboriginal Communities, Department of Premier and Cabinet, Western 
Australia, Perth, Western Australia, State Law Publisher. 
Government of Western Australia 2002. The Western Australian State Government's Action 
Plan for Addressing Family Violence and Child Abuse in Aboriginal Communities. 
The Response to the Inquiry into Response by Government Agencies to Complaints of 
Family Violence and Child Abuse in Aboriginal Communities, Perth, Government of 
Western Australia. 
Government of Western Australia 2004. Children and Community Services Act 2004. Perth, 
Western Australian State Law Publishers. 
Grey, K. 2014. Gov. Nixon Declares State Of Emergency And Curfew In Ferguson, It Goes 
Really Well. Wonkette [Online] https://www.wonkette.com/557367/gov-nixon-
declares-state-of-emergency-and-curfew-in-ferguson-that-goes-well  (accessed 9 June 
2017). 
Grossman, E. R. 2014. An Analysis of the Legality and Impact of Youth Curfew Laws on 
Criminal and Health-Related Outcomes. Dissertation/Thesis. Ann-Arbor,  ProQuest 
Dissertations Publishing. 
Jarvis, J. 2003. HYPE (Helping Young People Engage), Kimberley District, Department for 
Community Development. 
Karvelas, P. 2014. Curfews for kids to battle truancy: Indigenous schools push exclusive. 
Weekend Australian, 1 February, 1. 
Kline, P. 2012. The impact of juvenile curfew laws on arrests of youth and adults. American 
Law and Economics Review, 14–44. 
Koch, T. 2003. Curfews: Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia. Indigenous Law 
Bulletin, 5. 
MacArthur, C. 2007. The Emperor's New Clothes: The Role of the Western Australian Press 
and State Government in Selling the Story of the Northbridge Curfew. Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, Murdoch University, Perth. 
McDowall, D., Loftin, C. & Wiersema, B. 2000. The Impact of Youth Curfew Laws on 
Juvenile Crime Rates. Crime & Delinquency, 46, 76–91. 
Miller, R. 2015. Flooded Watseka institutes one-week curfew, Quincy declares state of 
emergency. The Capitol Fax Blog, https://capitolfax.com/ (2015–
0714T14:52:40.000Z)  
Mission Australia. n.d. On TRACK and Making Tracks (WA). Perth, Mission Australia. 
Moscovitz, H., Milzman, D. & Haywood, Y. 2000. The Washington, DC, youth curfew: 
Effect on transports of injured youth and homicides. Prehospital Emergency Care, 4, 
294–298. 
Nugent, M. 2008. Mapping Memories: Oral History for Aboriginal Cultural Heritage in New 
South Wales, Australia. In: HAMILTON, P. & SHOPES, L. (eds.) Oral history and 
public memories. Philadelphia, Temple University Press. 
O'Neil, M. 2002. Youth Curfews in the United States: The Creation of Public Spheres for 
Some Young People. Journal of Youth Studies, 5, 49–67. 
Office of Crime Prevention 2004. State Government in Northbridge Strategy. Young People 
in Northbridge Policy. One Year On. Policy Update June 2004, Perth, Office of 
Crime Prevention, Department of Premier and Cabinet. 
Office of Crime Prevention 2006a. State Government Northbridge Strategy. Report on the 
Young People in Northbridge Policy. The Policy Three Years On 2003–2006, Perth, 
Office of Crime Prevention, Western Australian Police. 
Office of Crime Prevention 2006b. Young People in Northbridge Policy: Government of WA 
updated 2006, Perth, Office of Crime Prevention. 
Outcare n.d. Curfews For Juveniles, do They Work?, Perth, Outcare. 
Rayner, M. 2003. Northbridge curfew. Indigenous Law Bulletin, 5, 9–13. 
Reynolds, K. M., Seydlitz, R. & Jenkins, P. 2000. Do juvenile curfew laws work? A time-
series analysis of the New Orleans law. Justice Quarterly, 17, 205–230. 
Short, S. 2012. Operation Safe Place, Perth, WA Police. 
South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council. 2015. An introduction to Noongar History and 
Culture. Perth, South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council. Available: 
http://www.noongar.org.au/images/pdf/forms/IntroductiontoNoongarCultureforweb.p
df  (accessed 22 Oct 2015). 
Stirling Council 2001. CS3 "HYPE" - Hillarys Youth Project Enquiries, Stirling, WA, 
Stirling Council. 
The Cairns Post 2009. Perth cops lead the way in curbing crimes. 19 September, p.2. 
Walsh, C. 1999. Imposing order: Child Safety Orders and Local Child Curfew schemes. The 
Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law, 21, 135–149. 
Weber, D. 2005. WA Liberal leader signals police water cannon plan. AM, Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation. [podcast]. 16 February. Available: 
http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2005/s1303787.htm (accessed 10 June 2017).  
White, R. 1996. Ten arguments against youth curfews. Youth Studies Australia, 15, 28–30. 
White, R. & Wyn, J. 2004. Youth and Society: Exploring the social dynamics of youth 
experience, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
White, R. D. 1990. No space of their own: young people and social control in Australia, 
Cambridge [England], Cambridge University Press. 
Wilson, D. B., Olaghere, A. & Gill, C. 2016. Juvenile curfew effects on criminal behavior 
and victimization: a Campbell Collaboration systematic review. Journal of 
Experimental Criminology, 12, 167–186. 
Yin, R. K. 2014. Case study research: design and methods, Los Angeles, Sage. 
‘Youth curfew violates equal-protection rights’ 2004. Connecticut Law Tribune, v10, 2 
February. 
 
Suggested citation:  
Cooper, T., & Love, T. (2017). A youth curfew: A retrospective view of the rise, fall and 
legacy of the Northbridge Policy. Australian Journal of Social Issues, 52(3), 204-221. 
doi:10.1002/ajs4.17 
 
